The Voting System Is the Exploit: How Plurality Voting Became the Backdoor AIPAC and Corporate PACs Walk Through Every Election
The machine that lets 24% of voters in a 13-person primary produce a congressperson — and why the Heritage Foundation is fighting hard to keep it that way
The machine that lets 24% of voters in a 13-person primary produce a congressperson — and why the Heritage Foundation is fighting hard to keep it that way
The Dinner Table Version
Here’s a question nobody at the political dinner table asks: if 76% of voters in your district voted against your congressperson — if the majority of actual humans who showed up never wanted them — how exactly is that person representing you?
The answer is: they’re not. And that gap — between who the people wanted and who actually ends up in Washington — is not a bug in the system. It is the system. And it has a name.
It’s called plurality voting. First-past-the-post. Winner-take-all. Whatever you call it, the math is the same: in a race with enough candidates, you can win with 21% of the vote, 18% of the vote, 24% of the vote. The majority of voters voted for someone else. You still win. You still go to Congress. You still represent the district — in name.
Here’s why this matters beyond civics class: a PAC, a lobbying group, or a foreign-interest organization doesn’t need to convince most of your neighbors to win. They just need to pick a crowded field, flood one candidate with money, and let the math do the rest. If 12 people split 76% of the vote, and their person gets 24%, their person wins.
In an Illinois congressional primary in March 2026, the winner had just 24% of the vote. The other 76% of voters chose someone else. That winner now represents the district.
In the 2022 midterm election, 120 congressional and statewide primaries were “won” with less than 50% of the vote — and sometimes as little as 21%.
This is not an edge case. This is Tuesday in America.
Now layer onto that the documented reality that AIPAC spent $126.9 million in the 2024 election cycle specifically targeting congressional primaries — where turnout is low, candidate fields are crowded, and winning percentages are small. And note that the Heritage Foundation, the most influential conservative think tank in Washington, has been running an active, funded campaign to kill ranked choice voting — the one reform that would mathematically require a winner to have actual majority support.
These two organizations don’t need to coordinate in writing to benefit from the same architecture. The architecture is the product.
This is the story of how the voting system itself became the exploit — and who profits from keeping it exactly where it is.
Part One: The Math — How Plurality Voting Works as a Capture Tool
The Basic Mechanism
Plurality voting is structurally simple: most votes wins, no minimum required. In elections with multiple candidates, the winning candidate might achieve only a small percentage of the total votes, potentially leaving many voters dissatisfied if their preferred candidate is not elected. Additionally, this system can encourage insincere voting, where individuals may choose a candidate they believe is more viable rather than their true preference.
That “insincere voting” dynamic is not incidental — it is the primary tool of capture. When voters believe their preferred candidate cannot win, they abandon that candidate and vote defensively. The perceived frontrunner, regardless of alignment with voter values, consolidates support not because they are the most popular but because they are perceived as the least risky bet.
In a five-person race, you don’t need the most voters. You need the most organized, funded, and activated voters. Dollars matter more when the threshold to win is lower.
The Primary Is Where It Happens
The decisive moment is almost never the general election. 85% of House seats are safely Republican or Democratic — another 9% lean significantly toward one party. This means that for the overwhelming majority of congressional districts in America, the winner of the primary is the winner of the seat. Full stop. General election is a formality.
92% of seats are “safe” or lean toward one party — meaning candidates can effectively win election and re-election by winning a small fraction of the primary electorate.
Do the math: if a district has 400,000 registered voters, and 15% turn out to vote in a primary, that’s 60,000 votes. If 8 candidates split that field, and one candidate gets 24%, that’s 14,400 votes. Fourteen thousand four hundred people effectively choose who represents 400,000.
And those 14,400 votes can be bought.
The Crowded Field Is the Feature
The structure incentivizes crowded primaries. More candidates in the field means a lower winning threshold. A PAC that wants to install a specific candidate in a seat does not need to convince a majority of voters. It needs to:
Recruit or identify a compliant candidate
Fund them heavily at the primary stage — before most voters are paying attention
Allow the vote-splitting of a crowded field to deliver victory with a plurality
One Republican candidate for Missouri secretary of state in 2024 openly acknowledged the strategy, stating that with eight candidates in the field, he didn’t need to compete for a large number of votes — he just needed to replicate the 158,000 votes he had received in a prior race, which in the new crowded field would be sufficient to win.
He said it out loud. Vote-splitting as explicit strategy. In a plurality system, this is not unusual — it is the standard playbook.
Part Two: The AIPAC Exploit — Plurality as Architecture
How AIPAC Uses the Math
AIPAC’s documented $126.9 million in 2024 election spending was not randomly distributed. It was concentrated in primaries — specifically, in Democratic primaries where progressive incumbents or candidates held seats or were running in crowded fields.
The Bowman race (NY-16) received $14.6 million in anti-Bowman spending. The Bush race (MO-1) received $8.6 million. Both were primaries with multiple candidates. Both featured vote-splitting dynamics that AIPAC’s preferred candidate exploited.
In a 2026 Illinois primary with 13 candidates on the ballot, AIPAC and its affiliates spent more than $5 million backing Chicago City Treasurer Melissa Conyears-Ervin. The race was a free-for-all contest, and AIPAC’s investment was designed to push her over the top in exactly the vote-splitting environment that plurality voting creates. In this case, AIPAC lost — the winner had 24% of the vote, but it wasn’t their candidate.
The model is clear: large field + concentrated funding + low turnout = low threshold to win = lower cost of capture.
The Removal Doctrine
The flip side of installing preferred candidates is removing dissenters. Under plurality voting, a sitting incumbent in a crowded primary is vulnerable to a well-funded challenger even if the majority of the district supports the incumbent — as long as that majority is split across multiple challengers while the PAC-backed candidate consolidates.
The formula:
Incumbent holds, say, 45% of the district’s genuine support
Four challengers split the remaining 55%
One challenger is heavily funded
That challenger gets 30% and wins
The incumbent is gone. The majority of voters wanted them to stay. The math delivered a different outcome.
Research shows that plurality winners receive 1.47 percentage points less in general elections compared to majority winners, and are 11.3 percentage points less likely to win competitive general elections. The system doesn’t just install captured candidates — it installs weaker ones, who are then more dependent on their funding sources to survive the general election.
Dependency compounds capture.
Part Three: The Heritage Foundation — Protecting the Exploit
Who Heritage Is and What It Does
The Heritage Foundation is Washington’s most influential conservative policy engine. Project 2025 — the governing blueprint for federal restructuring — was an Heritage production. Its policy positions shape Republican legislative agendas, judicial nominations, and regulatory frameworks. Its reach into the mechanics of government is documented and extensive.
It also has an active, funded, institutional campaign against ranked choice voting — the single electoral reform that would mathematically close the plurality exploit.
The Heritage Campaign Against RCV
Heritage has published multiple reports, commentary pieces, fundraising letters, and advocacy campaigns explicitly targeting ranked choice voting. The framing is that RCV is confusing, manipulative, and dangerous to democracy.
Heritage’s position frames RCV as “a scheme to disconnect elections from issues and allow candidates with marginal support from voters to win elections.”
Read that sentence and hold it next to the documented reality: under the current plurality system, candidates with 21-24% of votes regularly win congressional primaries and proceed to “safe” seats. A system that requires a majority is being framed as the system that produces “marginal” winners. The current system — which produces winners with less than a quarter of votes — is being defended as legitimate democracy.
Heritage’s fundraising materials are explicit: “These threats are why The Heritage Foundation — America’s most influential conservative think tank — is mounting opposition to the Ranked Choice Voting gimmick. Heritage is positioned to act. We’re releasing research and fact sheets to spread the truth about Ranked Choice Voting. And we can send respected experts across America to expose the devastating impacts of the RCV scheme on our nation’s democratic process.”
Heritage is fundraising specifically on the promise to kill ranked choice voting. This is not peripheral to Heritage’s mission — it is an active campaign with dedicated resources.
Heritage explicitly states it will “defend the Electoral College and block efforts to implement the National Popular Vote and ranked choice voting with our work in the media, in congressional hearings, and in the states.”
Why a Think Tank Fights This Hard Against a Voting Reform
The stated Heritage argument is that RCV is confusing. This argument does not survive contact with the evidence.
In Alaska, 84% of voters said RCV is simple in 2024. In Maine, 82% of voters said RCV is easy in both 2022 and 2024. In 2018, 90% of Maine primary voters said their experience with RCV was “excellent” or “good.”
The voters using it say it’s simple. The think tank that isn’t using it says it’s confusing. One of these parties has actual evidence.
Two states — Maine and Alaska — use RCV statewide. 36 cities and 3 counties use it for local elections. The outcomes: Democrats and Republicans alike have won RCV elections, including some of the most bipartisan members of Congress — Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), Rep. Jared Golden (D-ME), and Sen. Angus King (I-ME).
These are not radical outcomes. These are mainstream legislators, from both parties, elected by actual majorities. The Heritage argument that RCV produces “marginal” winners is empirically inverted.
The actual structural question is simpler: Heritage’s donors, allied PACs, and the broader network of concentrated capital interests that fund institutional conservatism benefit from the plurality exploit. Closing it means closing the low-threshold capture mechanism. That is not a theoretical concern. It is a financial one.
The Dark Money Architecture That Connects Everything
Heritage is not independently funded. Donor-advised funds — charitable investment accounts run by finance giants like Fidelity Investments, Charles Schwab, and Vanguard — have donated more than $18 million to the Heritage Foundation since 2020. The Heritage Foundation can then funnel money toward political campaigns through its separate “sister” dark money arm, Heritage Action for America.
The same anonymous donor-advised fund structure that obscures individual donations to Heritage also obscures individual donations to AIPAC’s 501(c)(4) arm. Both organizations benefit from the opacity. Both organizations benefit from the plurality voting architecture that makes large, targeted, early-primary spending maximally effective.
The symbiosis is structural, not conspiratorial. They don’t need to be in the same room. They need to be in the same system — and they are.
Part Four: What Ranked Choice Voting Actually Does to the Machine
The Mathematical Disruption
Ranked choice voting (RCV), also called instant runoff voting, works as follows: voters rank candidates in order of preference. If any candidate receives more than 50% of first-choice votes, they win immediately. If nobody reaches 50%, the last-place candidate is eliminated, and those voters’ second-choice preferences are redistributed. This continues until one candidate holds a genuine majority.
RCV has a major advantage over plurality voting: it provides a majority winner. That’s because the votes are tallied until a majority is found. Advocates say that it incentivizes candidates to campaign for second and third place on voters’ ballots, which in turn creates a less polarized, more civil atmosphere.
What this does to the capture architecture is not subtle. A PAC trying to install a candidate with 24% of the vote can no longer succeed. Their candidate must reach 50% — which means they must be the genuine preference of an actual majority. If 76% of voters prefer someone else, ranked choice forces that preference to accumulate. The majority wins.
In the 2022 midterm elections, 120 congressional and statewide primaries were “won” with less than 50% of the vote — sometimes as little as 21%. Maine and Washington, D.C. have solved these problems by adopting ranked choice voting for primaries — delivering a majority winner in a crowded field without a runoff.
The Crowded-Field Defense Collapses
The PAC strategy of “flood the field with candidates, let the split deliver your person” stops working under RCV. If voters can express second and third preferences, vote-splitting doesn’t advantage the funded candidate — it surfaces the actual aggregated preference of the electorate.
The Bowman and Bush removal operations — which depended on crowded primary fields, low turnout, and targeted spending concentrated on a single well-funded challenger — would face a fundamentally different environment under RCV. Voters could rank their genuine preferred candidates, and the majority preference would accumulate through rounds of counting, not fragment across a split field to deliver a plurality winner.
Research shows that ranked choice voting fosters more positive campaigns, since candidates need to appeal to voters who are ranking someone else first on their ballot. In Maine and Washington, D.C., candidates from both major parties have complimented each other on the debate stage, and campaigned side by side. In some cases, pairs of candidates running for the same office have even cross-endorsed — encouraging voters to rank both on their ballots.
Cross-endorsement is the opposite of the attack-ad primary environment that AIPAC’s super PAC operations depend on. Negative advertising drives down support for the target. Under RCV, a candidate who drives down support for opponents still needs voters to rank them second or third when their first choice is eliminated. Scorched-earth campaigns make that harder, not easier.
Part Five: The Architecture Diagram — The Two Systems as Code
Under Plurality Voting — The Current Machine
// PluralityVotingEngine.h
// Current U.S. Congressional Primary System
// The exploit as it runs today
@interface PluralityVotingEngine : NSObject
// Determines winner using only first-choice count
// No majority required. Largest fragment wins.
- (Candidate *)determineWinner:(NSArray<Candidate *> *)candidates
inField:(PrimaryField *)field;
// Calculates effective capture cost given field size
// More candidates = lower threshold = lower cost of capture
- (double)calculateCaptureCostFor:(Candidate *)target
fieldSize:(NSInteger)n
primaryTurnout:(double)turnout;
@end
@implementation PluralityVotingEngine
- (Candidate *)determineWinner:(NSArray<Candidate *> *)candidates
inField:(PrimaryField *)field {
// Count first-choice votes only
// All other voter preferences: DISCARDED
NSDictionary *voteCounts = [self countFirstChoiceVotes:candidates
field:field];
// Return candidate with highest count
// Even if that count is 21% of total votes
// Even if 79% of voters chose someone else
// Math says: highest fragment wins
return [self candidateWithHighestCount:voteCounts];
// NOTE: 79% of voter preferences are structurally irrelevant
// to the outcome. This is not an edge case. This is the rule.
}
- (double)calculateCaptureCostFor:(Candidate *)target
fieldSize:(NSInteger)n
primaryTurnout:(double)turnout {
// In a district of 400,000 registered voters:
// Primary turnout at 15% = 60,000 votes
// Winning threshold in 8-candidate field ≈ 20-25%
// Votes needed to win ≈ 12,000-15,000
double districtSize = 400000.0;
double activeVoters = districtSize * turnout;
double winningThreshold = 1.0 / (double)n * 1.2; // ~20-25% in n-way field
double votesNeeded = activeVoters * winningThreshold;
// Cost per activated vote in a low-information primary:
// approximately $80-$200 per vote via advertising
double costPerVote = 150.0;
double rawCaptureCost = votesNeeded * costPerVote;
// AIPAC discount: bundled donor network pre-activates
// a base of organized supporters before PAC spending begins.
// Effective cost is lower than raw calculation suggests.
double aipacNetworkDiscount = 0.35;
return rawCaptureCost * (1.0 - aipacNetworkDiscount);
// Returns: approximately $1.2M - $1.5M base cost to capture
// a "safe" congressional seat via a low-turnout crowded primary.
// AIPAC spent $14.6M on Bowman. That is not a close race.
// That is a 10x investment for a seat they wanted secured.
}
@end
// PACCaptureMachine.m
// The operational layer — how capture runs against the plurality system
@implementation PACCaptureMachine
- (void)executeCapture:(CongressionalSeat *)target
usingVotingSystem:(PluralityVotingEngine *)system {
// Step 1: Assess the field
NSInteger candidateCount = [self recruitOrCountCandidates:target];
// More candidates = lower threshold. Do not thin the field.
// Let it crowd. Vote-splitting is the mechanism.
// Step 2: Identify or install preferred candidate
Candidate *preferred = [self selectCompliantCandidate:target];
// Step 3: Concentrate early spending before voter attention
// Primary voters are low-information, low-engagement
// Name recognition at the moment of voting = proxy for quality
[self.adBuyNetwork executeEarlySpend:preferred
budgetFront:0.60]; // 60% pre-primary month
// Step 4: Let plurality math finish the job
// If 8 candidates split 75% of opposition vote,
// preferred candidate wins with 25%
// No majority needed. System delivers outcome.
double winThreshold = [system calculateCaptureCostFor:preferred
fieldSize:candidateCount
primaryTurnout:0.15];
NSLog(@"Capture complete. Votes needed: %.0f. Budget used: $%.0fM",
winThreshold, self.totalSpend / 1000000.0);
// Step 5: Seat is safe. No general election threat.
// Plurality primary winner in safe seat = installed operative.
// Cost: fractional compared to governing influence delivered.
}
@end
Under Ranked Choice Voting — The Same Operation Fails
// RankedChoiceVotingEngine.h
// The alternative system — how the math changes
@interface RankedChoiceVotingEngine : NSObject
// Determines winner by iterative majority-finding
// Voter preferences do not disappear when first choice loses
// They transfer. They accumulate. The majority finds itself.
- (Candidate *)determineWinner:(NSArray<Candidate *> *)candidates
withRankedBallots:(NSArray<RankedBallot *> *)ballots;
@end
@implementation RankedChoiceVotingEngine
- (Candidate *)determineWinner:(NSArray<Candidate *> *)candidates
withRankedBallots:(NSArray<RankedBallot *> *)ballots {
NSMutableArray *activeCandidates = [candidates mutableCopy];
NSMutableArray *activeBallots = [ballots mutableCopy];
while (YES) {
// Count current first-choice votes
NSDictionary *roundCount = [self tallyFirstChoices:activeBallots
among:activeCandidates];
// Check for majority
Candidate *leader = [self findMajorityWinner:roundCount
totalBallots:activeBallots.count];
if (leader) {
// A GENUINE MAJORITY EXISTS. Election is over.
// Winner has more than 50% of active votes.
// This is what plurality voting never guarantees.
NSLog(@"Majority winner found: %@ with %.1f%%",
leader.name,
[roundCount[leader.identifier] doubleValue] /
activeBallots.count * 100.0);
return leader;
}
// No majority yet. Eliminate last-place candidate.
Candidate *eliminated = [self findLastPlace:roundCount];
// CRITICAL: transfer their voters' preferences
// Their votes do not disappear.
// Voter intent is preserved and redistributed.
[self transferVotes:eliminated
toBallots:activeBallots
activeCandidates:activeCandidates];
[activeCandidates removeObject:eliminated];
}
}
@end
// PACCaptureAttempt_UnderRCV.m
// The same operation — different outcome
@implementation PACCaptureAttempt_UnderRCV
- (CaptureResult)executeCapture:(CongressionalSeat *)target
usingVotingSystem:(RankedChoiceVotingEngine *)rcv {
NSInteger candidateCount = [self countCandidates:target];
Candidate *preferred = [self selectCompliantCandidate:target];
// Step 1: Flood the zone — same strategy as plurality system
[self.adBuyNetwork executeEarlySpend:preferred budget:self.budget];
// Step 2: Attempt to win with 24% first-choice votes
// This is where plurality and RCV diverge fundamentally.
// Under plurality: 24% in a crowded field = WIN
// Under RCV: 24% in a crowded field = first-round leader,
// NOT winner. Rounds continue.
// Step 3: As last-place candidates are eliminated,
// their voters' second and third choices redistribute.
// The 76% who preferred other candidates now have their
// preferences aggregated through transfer rounds.
// If 76% of voters ranked anyone but the preferred candidate
// above them on their ballots, those transfers accumulate
// against the preferred candidate.
double genuineSupportShare = [self estimateGenuineSupport:preferred
district:target];
if (genuineSupportShare < 0.50) {
// Preferred candidate cannot reach majority.
// The math does not allow it.
// Majority winner will be whoever the actual electorate prefers.
NSLog(@"Capture failed. RCV requires genuine majority support.");
NSLog(@"First-choice votes: 24%%. Majority required: 50%% + 1.");
NSLog(@"76%% of voter preferences accumulated against capture target.");
return CaptureResultFailed;
}
// Capture only succeeds if preferred candidate
// genuinely has majority support — which means
// they were not installed by PAC funding alone.
// The voters actually wanted them.
// That is the point.
return CaptureResultSucceeded;
}
@end
The code is a metaphor. The math is real.
Part Six: The Kevin Bacon Map — How the Architecture Connects
Direct (1st degree) — The principal actors: Plurality voting rules (established in state statutes and federal law); Heritage Foundation as institutional defender of those rules; AIPAC as the operational beneficiary; corporate PACs and dark-money networks that exploit the same low-threshold primary environment.
Operational (2nd degree) — The maintenance layer: Heritage Action for America (Heritage’s 501(c)(4) political arm that carries the anti-RCV campaign into state legislatures); state-level Republican legislative caucuses that have passed anti-RCV bills in multiple states after Heritage lobbying; the donor-advised fund networks that fund Heritage anonymously; AIPAC’s United Democracy Project which operates in the low-threshold primary environment that plurality creates.
Strategic (3rd degree) — The design layer: Concentrated capital interests that benefit from installed, compliant legislators — defense contractors who benefit from uncritical foreign military aid appropriations; financial institutions that benefit from unquestioned monetary policy; pharmaceutical and insurance industries that benefit from health policy stasis. These industries don’t need to coordinate with AIPAC or Heritage. They share an interest in an electoral architecture that keeps installed, accountable-to-donors legislators in place.
Apex (command layer) — The feedback loop: The legislators installed through plurality primaries vote to maintain the rules that allowed them to be installed. They sit on committees that would hold hearings on electoral reform. They confirm judicial nominees who rule on election law. They fund or defund the agencies that administer elections. The installed class perpetuates the installation architecture. No coordination required.
Part Seven: What They Tell You vs. What the Record Shows
What They Tell YouWhat the Record ShowsPlurality voting is simple and fair — most votes winsIn 2022, 120 congressional primaries were won with less than 50% of the vote, sometimes as little as 21%RCV is confusing and disenfranchises voters84% of Alaska voters and 82% of Maine voters say RCV is “easy” or “simple” after using itRCV produces winners with “marginal support”Plurality voting literally produces winners with 21-24% of votes; RCV requires 50%+Heritage opposes RCV to protect votersHeritage is fundraising specifically on killing RCV, while receiving $18M+ from anonymous donor-advised fundsAIPAC spends to elect the best candidates for AmericaAIPAC concentrates spending in low-turnout primaries with crowded fields — the precise environment where the plurality exploit is most effectiveThe primary system reflects democratic choice92% of House seats are safe — meaning the plurality primary winner in those seats is effectively the congressperson, chosen by 15-20% of voters in a low-turnout, PAC-saturated environment
Part Eight: The Verdict
CAPTURED — the voting system itself.
The plurality primary architecture is not accidental. It is the substrate that makes large-scale PAC capture of Congress economically viable. Without it, the cost of installing a compliant legislator rises dramatically — you must earn genuine majority support, not just outspend a crowded field to a 24% plurality.
Heritage’s campaign against RCV is not about protecting voters from complexity. It is about protecting an electoral architecture that serves the organizations and interests in Heritage’s donor network — the same anonymous, dark-money, donor-advised fund structure that funds Heritage, funds AIPAC’s non-disclosure provisions, and funds the PAC networks that operate inside the low-threshold plurality environment.
Winners elected with RCV have majority support and truly represent their communities — meaning a stronger mandate to govern, or stronger nominees in primary elections. Candidates who win a majority in primary elections go on to perform better in general elections.
Majority mandate. Actual representation. Candidates accountable to voters, not donors.
That is precisely what the current architecture is designed to prevent.
The machine does not hide what it does. It just frames the solution as the problem, and the problem as tradition.
Now you have the wiring diagram.
Sources & Further Reading
Primary Sources on Plurality Voting
FairVote. Fewest Votes Wins: Plurality Victories in 2024 Primaries. fairvote.org, May 2025
FairVote. Fact Sheet: Ranked Choice Voting & 2026 Primaries. fairvote.org, February 2026
FairVote. The 2026 Elections and Ranked Choice Voting. fairvote.org, May 2026
Ballotpedia. Plurality Voting System. ballotpedia.org
Ballotpedia. Primary Election Vote Requirements by State. ballotpedia.org
NPR. The Voting System We Use Can Determine the Winner. Here’s How. November 2024
On Ranked Choice Voting in Practice 7. FairVote. Research and Data on RCV in Practice. fairvote.org 8. FairVote. The Ranked Choice Voting Act. fairvote.org, December 2025 9. NPR. How Ranked Choice Voting Works. November 2022 10. Wright, Reilly, and Lublin. Assessing Alaska’s Top-4 Primary and Ranked Choice Voting Electoral Reform: More Moderate Winners, More Moderate Policy. 2025
Heritage Foundation — Primary Documents 11. Heritage Foundation. Ranked Choice Voting Is a Bad Choice.heritage.org, Issue Brief No. 4996 12. Heritage Foundation. Ranked-Choice Voting Should Be Ranked Dead Last as an Election Reform. heritage.org, 2019 13. Heritage Foundation. Ensure Free and Fair Elections. heritage.org (institutional strategy document) 14. Heritage Foundation. Donate to Defend Our Election System. secured.heritage.org (fundraising appeal)
On Heritage Funding Architecture 15. The Lever / Institute for Policy Studies. Dark Money Just Got Darker: Wall Street Helped Fund Project 2025. September 2024 16. Jacobin. Most Large U.S. Public Charities Are Now Dark-Money Funds. July 2024
On AIPAC and Plurality Primaries 17. Fox News. AIPAC-Backed Chicago Democrat Loses Primary Despite Outside Spending Blitz. March 2026 18. FairVote Action. RCV Results from 2022. fairvoteaction.org 19. OpenSecrets. American Israel Public Affairs Committee — Organization Profile, 2024 Cycle. opensecrets.org
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